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Abstract
This paper deals with methods of measuring and analyzing effi-
ciency in transport industry. The aim of the paper is to introduce and
demonstrate the advantages of Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis
(MEA) in case of cost data with limited substitution possibilities. For
this purpose we reconsider the Norwegian bus data that has previously
been analyzed using econometric models and Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis; Jørgensen, Pedersen and Solvoll (1995), Jørgensen, Pedersen and
Volden (1997) and Odeck and Alkadi (2001). It is shown how, using
MEA, it becomes possible to disaggregate inefficiency into different
components corresponding to different types of cost generating vari-
ables and thereby provide both managers of the bus companies and
policy makers with more detailed information on possible improve-
ments of performance.
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1 Introduction
There is by now a considerable literature on the measurement of efficiency
in bus industries. In particular, recent European studies have considered the
British (Cowie and Asenova 1999) and the Norwegian (Jørgensen et al. 1995,
Jørgensen et al. 1997, and Odeck and Alkadi 2001) bus industry using para-
metric as well as non-parametric methods to estimate the levels of technical
efficiency - see e.g. Berechman (1993) or De Borger et al. (2000) for a review
of these methods. Moreover, the performance of the Swedish and Spanish
bus industry has been analyzed in Hulten and Folster (1998) and De Rus
and Nombela (1997) respectively. The primary interest seems to have been
to investigate the effects of ownership, company size, geographical location
etc. on the efficiency assessments. Once such effects are clarified there are
of course immediate implications for company management and transport
policy.
In the present paper we intend to reconsider the Norwegian bus data.
Previously, Jørgensen, Pedersen and Solvoll (1995), have studied the cost
structure of the Norwegian bus companies using a modified Cobb-Douglas
function. Jørgensen, Pedersen and Volden (1997) use a stochastic frontier
model to estimate the inefficiency of bus operations and disclose an average
saving potential for the Norwegian bus companies between 14 % and 7% de-
pending upon the underlying assumptions. Finally, Odeck and Alkadi (2001)
use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate the level of efficiency with
results showing an average saving potential of around 28 % (with a slightly
different data set).
For analysis of the Norwegian bus data we apply yet another method to
estimate the levels of inefficiency; the so-called Multi-directional Efficiency
Analysis (MEA), see Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999 and 2002) and Asmild et
al. (2003). MEA, like DEA, is a non-parametric method, differing from DEA
in the way in which efficiency is measured. In other words, MEA makes use
of an entirely different efficiency index. We shall argue that MEA is better
suited for dealing with technologies exhibiting limited substitution possibil-
ities (in inputs) as in the present model of bus companies. Moreover, in
general MEA has the advantage that from a managerial viewpoint, it pro-
vides more relevant performance information (in a sense to be made precise
in the following) and it allows for a more substantive analysis of the effect of
external variables on the inefficiency scores.
Throughout the paper we shall compare our results with the results ob-
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tained from previous studies of the Norwegian bus industry. In short, we
find considerable improvement potentials that are even larger than those es-
timated by Odeck and Alkadi. In addition to the results in Odeck and Alkadi,
we are able to relate specific improvement potentials to the specific input di-
mensions and reveal that DEA seems to overestimate the savings potential
in fuel costs, whereas, for example, it underestimates the savings potential
in costs that are not related to fuel or driver utilization. Further analysis on
the influence of external factors indicate that public companies have a better
utilization of fuel than private companies. Given fuel costs, on the other
hand, private companies have a better utilization of drivers than public com-
panies. Subsidy allocation policies have no effect on the utilization of fuel and
drivers. There is, though, an effect on other costs in the sense that ceteris
paribus companies with negotiated subsidies are less efficient than companies
with subsidies based on cost norms. Such effects cannot be analyzed using a
single efficiency score as in e.g. DEA.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a further motiva-
tion for the paper. Section 3 presents the data set and basic input-output
model to be used, and a preliminary investigation of the data is performed.
Section 4 presents the general methodology. The potential improvements
idea is introduced and the programmes of Multi-directional Efficiency Anal-
ysis (MEA) are stated. Section 5 presents the results of MEA and uses the
related results from DEA for comparison. Section 6 goes on to further inves-
tigate the results and the findings are compared to the results obtained from
the previous studies of the Norwegian bus data in Section 7.
2 Motivation
As mentioned in the introduction, previous studies of the Norwegian bus
industry have used different techniques and obtained surprisingly different
results even taking into account that different data sets were used. The most
recent study in Odeck and Alkadi (2001) is the one disclosing the worst state
of performance, with an average saving potential of 28 % using the DEA
technique to assess levels of inefficiency. In general, we agree that some form
of non-parametric analysis is preferable when assessing cost efficiency of bus
companies. However, the particular choice of DEA is unfortunate in this case
as we shall presently explain.
Since the bus companies are subsidized and their route frequency is partly
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predetermined it seems natural to consider aspects of cost efficiency, that is,
to focus on the ability of the bus services to operate efficiently measured
in terms of costs per output (in the present study, seat kilometers, defined
in Section 3). In other words, the underlying production process related to
bus services is described by a number of cost generating inputs (fx. fuel and
personnel) and output. For such production technologies one should indeed
expect to find rather limited substitution possibilities between cost driving
inputs; buses are worth nothing without drivers, fuel is worth nothing without
buses etc. Indeed, it seems that technologies representing the performance
of different types of transport units are likely to resemble so-called Leontief
technologies.
It is well known that DEA with its use of the Farrell efficiency index
performs badly when the technology is characterized by limited substitution
possibilities (see e.g. Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell 1993). The problem is sim-
ply that dominated companies may appear as efficient and that a relatively
large part of the sample will be measured against such dominated bench-
mark units – this seems to call for the use of another type of efficiency index
that only refers to undominated benchmark units. Moreover, contrary to
the previous studies of the Norwegian bus data that have focused on the
overall performance of the bus industry, we focus on analyzing managerial
performance by estimating the improvement potential in each input dimen-
sion taken separately for each company – again this seems to call for more
attention related to the benchmark selection process.
In the DEA literature there are several tricks in order to avoid that ineffi-
cient companies are assigned maximum performance score or that companies
in general are compared to dominated benchmarks. Technically, the Farrell
index may be generalized such that reference to undominated benchmarks is
ensured, for example, using the Russell index (see e.g. Fa¨re, Grosskopf and
Lovell 1993). Loosely speaking, the implicit selection of benchmarks (because
it is actually an implicit selection correspondence) related to the Russell in-
dex, for a given company, is determined by minimizing a linear function with
gradient equal to the inverse of the company’s input usage over the set of
dominating production plans (see also Section 4 for further details). Thus,
as an implicit selection procedure the Russell index does not ensure unique
selection and the selection it ensures is determined by past production in a
one dimensional sense, just as in case of the Farrell index, only this time
in the dual space (as fixed pseudo prices). Moreover, as an efficiency index
the value is practically without economic interpretation and therefore void
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of managerial information.
Now, a more direct approach is taken in Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999,
2003), where it is suggested to focus on the benchmark selection procedure
and then, as a second order issue, to consider the measurement of inefficiency.
In short, the idea is to analyse the improvement potentials in each input
(or output) dimension separately for each company in the sample. Instead
of considering improvements in proportion to past production, as in DEA,
or relative to the cost minimizer given pseudo-prices determined by past
production, as in case of the Russell index, it seems more natural to consider
improvement potential in proportion to the input specific saving potentials:
Some companies may have limited possibilities to save on some inputs while
they have considerable possibilities to save on others. A benchmark selection
based on potential improvements is always undominated, and in Bogetoft
and Hougaard (op cit. ), it is demonstrated that its axiomatic foundation is
indeed more attractive than the foundation of the implicit Farrell benchmark
selection as used in DEA. In the present paper we shall use the benchmark
selection based on potential improvements and estimate the improvement
potentials (or excesses) in each input dimension for each bus company. The
specific approach that we apply has been named Multi-directional Efficiency
Analysis (MEA) in Asmild et al. (2003).
To disclose input specific improvement potentials is of course an advan-
tage from a purely managerial point of view as it immediately indicates
the specific dimensions where performance has to be improved. In fact, as
we shall demonstrate empirically, there may be huge differences in the uti-
lization of different inputs for the same company. Furthermore, the input
specific information also turns out to provide a much better foundation for
subsequent analyses of the influence of external factors. To be more spe-
cific, the results can be analysed using multivariate analysis of the relative
improvement potentials and that provides the opportunity to consider the
managerial implications with respect to various unmodelled issues - possibil-
ities that are somewhat limited using e.g. DEA or econometric approaches.
We shall demonstrate that compared to the information from DEA, the MEA
approach provides additional insights with respect to ‘characterizations’ of
efficient companies and thereby better indications for various transport pol-
icy issues, such as the importance of ownership, competitive pressure, and
contract design.
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3 Cost efficiency model and data description
Data have been provided from official reports from 175 subsidized Norwe-
gian bus companies to the county councils for the 1991 calendar year. The
complete database covers all 175 bus companies but 21 companies had to be
discarded due to extreme observations or missing data for key variables to be
used as inputs. Four companies appeared to have reported inaccurate data.
Six other companies were considered to operate in incomparable conditions
with reference to the other companies in the database (for example, one of
these is the main bus operator in Oslo, another is a small company with
very low costs because some routes are served by hired taxi cabs). Data for
11 companies could not be used in the analysis due to missing information
on costs. Except from the county Buskerud, each of the 17 remaining Nor-
wegian counties are represented in the data set and most counties have a
number of entries in the database (the only exception is Finnmark County,
the county furthest to the North with only a single bus company). The com-
pany size in the data set varies considerably; if number of seat kilometers
is used as an indicator of size then the smallest company achieves approxi-
mately 460,800 seat kilometers, the largest company provides 620.5 mill seat
kilometers, while the average bus company provides 93 mill seat kilometers.
To model the productive activities undertaken by the bus companies we
use the following cost variables as inputs:
Inputs: Fuel costs, Driver costs and Other costs.
All inputs are measured in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). The variable Other
costs includes remaining costs items (including depreciation).
For each company Seat kilometers is calculated as the total number of
vehicle kilometers times the average bus size (sum of seating capacity and
standing places). Consequently, Seat kilometers captures the aspect of dif-
ferences in bus size and is chosen as a proxy for output:
Output: Seat kilometers.
Descriptive statistics for 154 companies are given for the input and output
variables in Table 1. A common feature is that the distributions are highly
skewed to the right and very large variations are present. This is due to large
variations between companies in both number of busses and kilometers.
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Variable Mean Median Min Max Std.dev.
Fuel 1,571,908 84,730 16,151 9,775,000 1,902,667
Driver 9,392,579 4,198,948 64,000 72,129,317 12,889,105
Other 12,344,193 6,724,687 113,646 96,070,696 15,987,531
Seat kms. 93,092,799 48,267,000 460,800 620,418,190 117,407,247
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for in- and output variables.
On the basis of the available information, it is possible to examine the
extent to which inefficiency can be explained by certain characteristics which
may be of importance in shaping performance of bus companies. Besides geo-
graphical information on the area where the companies operate, the following
information may be used:
* Whether the bus company is engaged in sea transport (10%) or not
(90%).
* Whether the bus company operates in a coastal area (53%) or not
(47%).
* Whether the bus company is privately (77%) or publicly owned (23%).
* Whether the method of subsidy allocation includes the ability to nego-
tiate the size of the subsidy (49%) or is based entirely on cost norms
(51%).1
The majority of bus companies are not engaged in sea transport. More-
over, the majority of subsidized bus companies are privately owned and a
slight majority of the companies received subsidy from the county based on
cost norms.
3.1 A first look at the data
The first impression of the data set is that companies with low input costs
have low values of Seat kilometers, and vice versa. Moreover, low costs in
one input-dimension is typically followed by low costs in the other input
1Contracts between bus companies and county councils are generally based on cost
norms but some companies have the ability to negotiate with the councils over the size of
the subsidy.
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dimensions as well, and the variation increases with increasing company size.
In other words, the data points lie within a narrow convex cone indicating
that bus services can be described by an underlying technology with constant
returns to scale (CRS).
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Figure 1: Normalized Fuel costs versus normalized Driver costs.
If we restrict attention only to fuel and driver costs this picture becomes
even clearer as it can be expected that very limited substitution possibilities
between fuel and driver inputs are present. In Figure 1, using the assumption
of constant returns to scale, we have normalized the inputs by the output
variable Seat kilometers and hence obtained a given isoquant. Indeed, it
appears that only one observation is undominated and hence determines the
frontier of the input possibility set. In other words, the isoquant is a Leontief
isoquant (with no substitution between inputs). Further analysis show that
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the extreme inefficient companies are all small, whereas among the more
efficient companies all sizes are present.
Adding the third input variable Other costs will only result in a slightly
changed performance picture, as we shall see in Section 5, despite the fact
that Other costs involves a number of different cost items with possible larger
variation between the companies. Consequently, by introducing the input
variable Other costs we also introduce substitution possibilities although they
remain limited.
For further analysis of the cost data it seems straightforward to apply
methods like Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA, see e.g. Charnes et al. 1994)
to measure the efficiency of each bus company, as done in Odeck and Alkadi
(2001) for example. However, as mentioned in Section 2, it is well known
that the standard version of DEA uses the radial Farrell index of technical
efficiency which has the drawback that it may implicitly relate to dominated
benchmark units. In the worst case this implies that index value 1 (indicating
best performance) may be assigned to companies that are actually dominated
in one or more inputs (or outputs). Unfortunately this problem is particularly
critical in our case, as the underlying technology of the bus companies closely
resembles a Leontief technology where inputs cannot be substituted. It is
easy to get an idea of the problem by looking at Figure 1 above where any
bus company that is not located on the ray from the origin through the
point determined by the undominated company (solid line in Figure 1) is
implicitly compared to benchmarks on the vertical or horizontal segment of
the isoquant (dashed lines in Figure 1). In fact, all inefficient observations
in Figure 1 are compared to either the vertical or the horizontal part of the
frontier and thereby compared to dominated benchmarks.
As mentioned in Section 2, we suggest to apply Multi-directional Effi-
ciency Analysis (or MEA) in order to analyse cost efficiency of the Norwe-
gian bus companies. Hence, the following section will briefly review this
procedure.
4 Methodology: Multi-directional Efficiency
Analysis
Before the linear programming problems involved in the calculation of the
inefficiency scores using Multi-directional Efficiency Analysis (MEA-scores)
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are stated, it is necessary to define the potential improvements benchmark
selection and the related efficiency index. For terms of reference, the potential
improvements approach will be compared to the implicit benchmark selection
of the Farrell and Russell efficiency index.
To provide some intuition consider Figure 2, where x = (x1, x2) is the
input combination of a given company and L is the
X1
X2
O
L
X
SPI
SF
XR
X-1
SR
Figure 2: Illustration of the MEA procedure.
production possibility set determined by convex data envelopment.
Using Farrell’s index of technical efficiency where the implicit benchmark
is found in proportion to past production x, the plan SF is selected. Using the
Russell index, where benchmarks are those production plans (in this partic-
ular case the unique plan) that minimize a linear function with gradient 1/x
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over the set of undominated production plans, the implicit selection becomes
SR. Finally, using the potential improvements approach the benchmark SPI
is selected relative to the input specific improvement potentials.
Thus, in general SPI is determined in the following way: Relative to x ∈
Rm+ the ideal production x
R(x) ∈ Rm+ is determined by xR(x) = (xRi (x))mi=1
where xRi (x) = min{x′i ∈ R|(x1, . . . , x′i, . . . , xm) ∈ L} and L is the input
requirement set – that is, xR is found as the full input reduction potential in
each input dimension taken separately. The benchmark selection SPI is found
as the largest possible reduction of x in the direction of the ideal production
xR, that is, in proportion to the input specific excesses xi − xRi .
Comparing the three approaches based on Figure 2 we see that the Farrell
selection neglects the huge (both absolute and relative) improvement poten-
tial in input 1 since by definition we are forced to consider only reductions
proportional to the actual production. In the extreme opposit case the Rus-
sell selection completely disregards the improvement potential in input 2,
although this is also significant. The potential improvements selection, on
the other hand, ensures that the selected benchmark reflects the size of the
individual improvement potentials by considering reductions in proportion
to these. For a general analysis of the merrits of the potential improvements
approach the reader is referred to Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999), Hougaard
and Tvede (2002) and Asmild et al. (2003).
Now, the potential improvements inefficiency index EPI is then deter-
mined as the (possibly weighted)2 average of the excesses relative to bench-
mark SPI in each input dimension i, i.e., as the average of xi − SPIi for
all i. Therefore efficient companies get index value (MEA-score) 0, whereas
inefficient companies get scores larger than 0 and increasing with increasing
inefficiency; see Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999) for further theoretical details.
Let a set of n decision making units, DMUs, (j = 1, . . . , n) produce s
outputs yr (r = 1, . . . , s) using m inputs xi (i = 1, . . . ,m). Consider the
production plan (xk, yk) of DMUk. To calculate the value of the potential
improvements inefficiency index for DMUk, the ideal reference point x
R(xk)
is found by solving m linear programming problems (one for each input di-
mension):
minλ,θi θi s.t.
2Weights may be exogeneously determined by the analyst but in the present study we
use a simple average.
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∑n
j=1 λ
jxji ≤ θi,∑n
j=1 λ
jxj−i ≤ xk−i, −i = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . ,m∑n
j=1 λ
jyjr ≥ ykr , r = 1, . . . , s
for λ ≥ 0 or λ ∈ {λ ≥ 0|∑j λj = 1}
assuming constant or variable returns to scale respectively.
Letting (λ∗, θi∗) solve the above problems for i = 1, . . . ,m, the ideal point
is given by xR(xk) = (θ1∗, . . . , θm∗). If xR(xk) = (θ1∗, . . . , θm∗) = xk we know
that DMUk is (input) efficient and consequently E
NPI(xk) = 0. Hence,
assume that xR(xk) 6= xk and consider the following linear programming
problem:
maxλ,β β s.t.∑n
j=1 λ
jxji ≤ xki − β(xki − xRi (xk)), i = 1, . . . ,m∑n
j=1 λ
jyjr ≥ ykr , r = 1, . . . , s
for λ ≥ 0 or λ ∈ {λ ≥ 0|∑j λj = 1}.
The solution (λ∗∗, β∗) to this program can be used to determine both the
benchmark selection SPI and the index value EPI as follows:
SPI(xk) = xk − β∗(xk − xR(xk)),
and
EPI(xk) =
m∑
i=1
(xki − SPIi (xk)) = β∗
m∑
i=1
(xki − xRi (xk)),
where excesses in all dimensions are considered equally important (otherwise
a weighted sum could have been used). Note that since all input variables
are measured on the same monetary scale (in NOK) the value of EPI directly
indicates the monetary loss connected with being inefficient. In the following
we shall also consider the relative improvement potential both in general and
with respect to the individual inputs, i.e.,
EPI(xk)
xk
=
β∗
∑m
i=1(x
k
i − xRi (xk))
xk
,
and
β∗(xki − xRi (xk))
xki
, ∀i.
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Note, that in the case where there are no substitution possibilities in
inputs, i.e. when the isoquants are Leontief isoquants, the value of the Russell
index is identical to (one minus) the average of the relative input specific
improvement potentials. This however, is not the case when substitution
possibilities are introduced as in our three input model in Section 5 below.
Now, one way to compare the potential improvements index with the
Farrell index,
F (x) = min{t ∈ R|tx ∈ L}, x ∈ L,
on the premisses of the first, is to use the implicit Farrell selection SF =
F (x)x instead of SPI in the definition of EPI . A Farrell inefficiency index
may hence be defined as,
EF (x) =
m∑
i=1
(xi − SFi ) = (1− F (x))
m∑
i=1
xi.
Clearly, EF (x) ≥ 0 and its value increases as x gets more inefficient.
Below, we shall refer to values of the index EPI , calculated using the above
programmes, as MEA-scores for each observation in the data set. Likewise
we shall refer to values EF as DEA-scores.
5 Results and comparison with DEA
Initially, the input-output model described in Section 3 is analysed assuming
a constant returns to scale technology. The main focus will be on results
obtained by analysis of the MEA scores, but DEA-scores will be used for
comparison. In an attempt to study the influence of the variable Other costs
on the measure of inefficiency, a model with only Fuel costs and Driver costs
is analysed in addition to a model including all three input variables.
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MEA, CRS. Only inefficient companies
Model with three inputs
Absolute excess (NOK) Relative excess (%)
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Fuel 387,359 8,024 2.762,840 29.3 6.66 68.6
Driver 3,441,167 31,977 35,235,119 38.6 2.19 78.3
Other 5,239,511 39,472 49,295,492 43.2 2.08 77.9
MEA scores 9,068,039 95,705 82,843,537 40.8 2.73 76.3
Model with two inputs
Absolute excess (NOK) Relative excess (%)
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Fuel 620,996 10,304 3,878,981 44.4 15.4 77.5
Driver 5,683,112 41,061 50,569,252 60.7 16.9 88.4
MEA scores 6,304,108 51,365 53,000,937 58.5 20.6 87.1
Table 2. MEA results under CRS.
In the sample of 154 bus companies only one (0.6%) turns out to be fully
efficient in the two-input model as shown in Figure 1 above, whereas three
companies (1.9%) become fully efficient if the third input variable is added
and the full model is considered. In Table 2 the size of the input specific
excesses (xi−SPIi ) are summarized. Only inefficient companies are included.
Considering the three-input model the average excess is around 9 mill. NOK,
out of which 5.2 mill. NOK originates from excess in Other costs, 3.4 mill.
NOK from Driver costs and an average excess of 0.4 mill. NOK is from
Fuel costs. The immediate observation is that there are large potentials for
cost saving in all inputs. But the absolute saving potentials are, of course,
largest for Other costs and Driver costs, as they constitute the main cost
categories. Considering the relative potentials for costs saving (Table 2), the
saving potentials are of almost equal magnitude. Still, the largest saving can
be obtained for Other costs. Both for the absolute and the relative saving,
large variations between companies are present.
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MEA, VRS. Only inefficient companies
Model with three inputs
Absolute excess (NOK) Relative excess (%)
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Fuel 357,546 831 2,660,524 27.2 1.01 55.4
Driver 2,606,390 6,868 13,993,339 35.7 1.66 70.7
Other 3,910,512 5,199 28,321,401 35.8 1.59 73.9
MEA scores 6,874,448 23,863 41,448,926 35.8 2.26 70.1
Table 3. MEA results under VRS.
Comparing the model with only two inputs (Fuel costs and Driver costs)
with the three input model, the mean potential improvements becomes larger
when Other costs are disregarded. The relative saving increases; for the mean
relative saving this increase is 52% for Fuel costs and 57% for Driver costs.
Consider MEA scores under the assumption of variable returns to scale
(VRS). In the model with three inputs the number of fully efficient companies
increases to 15 (9.7%). Further, as a consequence of the variable returns to
scale assumption, the distances from the observations to the frontier of the
estimated production possibility set becomes smaller, which is reflected in
a decrease in all mean excesses as seen in Table 3. Potential improvements
are still largest for variables Other costs and Driver costs both absolute and
relative. Notice that the potential improvement for variable Other costs is
relatively speaking reduced the most compared to the constant returns to
scale scenario. This is mainly due to the fact that substitution possibilities
(although limited) are introduced by the variable Other costs.
The standard DEA model uses Farrell’s radial efficiency score and hence
implicitly a benchmark found as the intersection between the ray from the
origin and the frontier of the production possibility set. To compare MEA
and DEA we may interpret the DEA efficiency scores along the lines of the
MEA methodology by accessing the absolute excesses relative to the DEA
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DEA, CRS. Only inefficient companies
Model with three inputs
Absolute excess (NOK) Relative excess (%)
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Fuel 529,780 7,458 3,114,769 37.3 2.48 74.7
Driver 3,146,246 37,345 21,735,231 37.3 2.48 74.7
Other 4,257,531 41,556 29,035,148 37.3 2.48 74.7
DEA scores 7,933,557 86,360 53,191,933 37.3 2.48 74.7
DEA, VRS. Only inefficient companies
Model with three inputs
Absolute excess (NOK) Relative excess (%)
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Fuel 379,202 1,073 2,260,199 30.9 1.62 63.8
Driver 2,154,572 6,674 12,802,299 30.9 1.62 63.8
Other 3,036,868 7,390 16,985,531 30.9 1.62 63.8
DEA scores 5,570,642 15,447 29,211,851 30.9 1.62 63.8
Table 4. DEA results under CRS and VRS.
selected benchmark unit as described in Section 4. These results are given
in Table 4 for both constant and variable returns to scale. The overall total
excess is seen to be smaller than the excess obtained using MEA. That is,
in general DEA underestimates the reduction potential with around 1 mill.
NOK on average, corresponding to 13% for constant and 19% for variable
returns to scale.
Looking at specific inputs this picture becomes somewhat more complex.
The mean of the excess obtained from Fuel costs by DEA are 36.7% larger
than the mean excess obtained from MEA. Furthermore, assuming constant
returns to scale technology the mean excess obtained from Driver costs by
DEA is 8.5% smaller than the corresponding excess from MEA while the
excess obtained from Other costs is 18.7% smaller than the MEA excess. A
similar tendency is seen if a variable returns to scale technology is assumed.
Notice that in the standard version of DEA it is assumed that the relative
excesses are independent of input direction. In our case the calculated mean
of the relative excesses is 37.3% in the constant returns to scale case and
30.9% in the variable returns to scale case.
17
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Relative excess: MEA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
R
el
at
iv
e 
ex
ce
ss
: D
EA
Fuel
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Relative excess: MEA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
R
el
at
iv
e 
ex
ce
ss
: D
EA
Driver
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Relative excess: MEA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
R
el
at
iv
e 
ex
ce
ss
: D
EA
Other
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Relative excess: MEA
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
R
el
at
iv
e 
ex
ce
ss
: D
EA Total
Figure 3: Relative DEA and MEA excesses against each other for each input
variable and the total costs under CRS. Model with three inputs.
Considering the company specific excesses (Figure 3), the above men-
tioned differences between DEA and MEA excesses are generally speaking
re-discovered. For Fuel costs almost all companies have larger relative DEA
excess than MEA excess, whereas the opposite tendency is present for Other
costs. The input variable Driver costs displays a somewhat mixed picture,
with some companies having the largest relative excess with respect to MEA
and others with respect to DEA. In other words, DEA overestimates the
reduction potential in Fuel costs and underestimates the reduction potential
in Other costs. In total, we find that DEA underestimates the reduction po-
tential, as 69% of the companies have larger relative excesses in MEA than
in DEA with a maximal difference of 27%. A closer inspection of the total
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Company Method Fuel costs Driver costs Other costs
Unit no. 15 DEA 0.17 0.17 0.17
MEA 0.30 0.15 0.51
Unit no. 115 DEA 0.38 0.38 0.38
MEA 0.29 0.48 0.63
Table 5. Relative DEA and MEA excesses for two specific companies under
CRS.
relative excesses demonstrates, though, that 52% of the companies differs
less than 1% in the relative potential saving between MEA and DEA.
To emphasize the difference between relative DEA excesses and relative
MEA excesses on a company level, consider Table 5. Here the values for two
specific companies are shown. The relative DEA excesses are the same (by
definition) while the relative MEA scores vary extensively, and clearly differ
significantly from the DEA excesses.
To sum up on the difference between MEA and DEA: First, since MEA
only relates to undominated benchmark units, the overall tendency is that
MEA discloses more improvement potential than DEA, as demonstrated in
Tables 2,3,4, and 5 and Figure 3. Second, the use of the Farrell index in DEA
forces the relative improvement potentials to be identical for all inputs, as
seen in Table 4 and 5. Thus, we do not get any impression of differences in
the utilization of the various inputs. MEA, on the other hand, provides such
a performance picture, where some inputs are revealed as having a larger
improvement potential than others, cf. Table 5. In this specific case we saw
that DEA had a tendency of overestimating the reduction potential in Fuel
costs, but underestimate the reduction potential in Other costs, as seen in
Figure 3. From a purely managerial point of view, this information is highly
relevant, since it suggests where to improve performance for the individual
companies: Some companies may find large improvement potentials in Driver
costs, others in Fuel, and so on. Furthermore, the input specific information
also has implications for further analysis of the efficiency result, as we shall
demonstrate in Section 6 below.
19
6 Some managerial implications of unmod-
elled issues
As mentioned above, MEA scores provide the possibility for a more subtle
analysis of different impacts of external factors with respect to the individual
cost variables. This will be demonstrated by comparison with a similar kind
of analysis using DEA scores for the three input model with constant returns
to scale.
For analyzing the influence of the external factors on the saving poten-
tials, the following variables are available, as described in Section 3: County;
Coastal area, that is whether or not the bus company operates in coastal area;
Sea transport, that is whether or not the company is engaged in sea transport;
Ownership, that is private or public companies; and Subsidy allocation, that
is whether this is based on negotiations or cost norms. The variable Coastal
area is coarser than the variable County and it could be appropriate to in-
clude nested effects, but due to the relatively limited number of companies
compared to number of external variables included, it has not been possi-
ble to further distinguish between counties. Thus, only the coarser variable
Coastal area is used to describe geographical variations. Furthermore, since
almost all companies engaged in sea transport are private companies oper-
ating in coastal areas, an eventual effect of being involved in sea transport
must be analysed within this subgroup.
To assess the influence of the external factors on the relative MEA ex-
cesses, analyses were performed in each input direction separately. Since
the relative MEA excesses are highly correlated with all three correlations
being roughly 0.9, the marginal analyses were supplemented with a multi-
variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) (e.g., Rao (1965 or later), Johnson
& Wichern (1992)). Here the relative excesses are considered as a multi-
variate response rather than as a collection of univariate responses. This
may provide additional information in cases where the marginal responses
are dependent. Moreover, the conditional distribution of each input variable
given one or both of the others are analysed. Both marginal analyses, con-
ditional analyses, and multivariate analyses performed subsequently depend
to some extent on normality within subgroups defined by the external vari-
ables and combinations hereof. But even though the relative excesses, both
in MEA and in DEA, are bounded between zero and one, closer inspection
of the distribution of the data including analysis of the residuals reveals that
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the assumption of normality is not unreasonable. Moreover, as only three
companies are fully efficient the classical problem with several observations
with zero excess vanishes. Ordinary F or t tests are used for marginal and
conditional analyses, and since the number of degrees of freedom is large, F
test approximations to Wilks lambda are used in evaluation of significance
when performing MANOVA.
Analyzing the relative MEA excesses in the three-dimensional normal
distribution model (MANOVA) it turns out that an interaction term between
Coastal area and Subsidy allocation has weak but significant influence on
the mean (F(3,144))=2.96, p=0.4%), and that the effect of Ownership is
significant (F(3,144)=4.57, p=0.4%).
It is well-known that using MANOVA significant effects can occur even
if an external variable influences nothing but one of the dependent variables.
A more comprehensive investigation of the effects, therefore, was performed.
First, marginal analyses shows a particulary simple model for relative excess
in Fuel costs, that depends only on Ownership and Coastal area.
Analysing the conditional distributions given relative excess in Fuel costs
it was found that only Ownership had a significant effect on relative excess in
Driver costs. Continuing this successive conditioning only Subsidy allocation
were found to affect the relative excess in Other costs.
The analysis performed then results in the following structural equations,
as giving a fairly good description of the data.
µROE = αOther + β1RFE + γRDE + δSubsidy allocation,
µRDE = αDriver + β2RFE + νOwnership,
µRFE = αFuel + ξOwnership + ηCoastal area,
where µ’s are conditional mean values for the relative MEA excesses of Fuel
(RFE), Driver (RDE), and Other (ROE) costs respectively. Regarding the
estimated effects, companies operating in coastal areas have higher potential
for saving in Fuel costs than non-coastal companies . The estimated differ-
ence is ηˆCoastal area=0.0996 (SE: 0.0195) meaning that the potential saving is
9.96 percentage points larger for companies operating in coastal areas. Fur-
thermore, private companies have higher (ξˆOwnership =6.49% (SE: 2.28%))
potential for saving in Fuel cost than public companies. Controlling for rel-
ative excess in Fuel cost, the effect of ownership on Driver costs was that
public companies have larger (νˆOwnership=3.98% (SE:1.34%)) saving poten-
tial than private companies. Finally, the effect of Subsidy allocation policy
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on the relative excess in Other costs, given the relative excess in both Driver
and Fuel costs, was that companies with subsidy allocation based on negoti-
ations had larger (δˆSubsidy allocation=2.92% (SE: 0.90%)) potential for relative
saving than those with subsidy allocation based on cost norms.
Concerning private companies operating in coastal areas, the relative po-
tential saving in Driver cost is 5.6% (SE: 0.23%) lower for those not engaged
in sea transport than for companies engaged in sea transport.
Considering the relative DEA excesses, the result of performing an ordi-
nary analysis of variance (or multiple regression analysis) shows that only
the variable Coastal area has significant influence on the saving potential
(t(149)=4.9, p ≤ 0.00%). The estimated difference is 0.108 (SE=0.022),
meaning that the relative potential saving for companies operating in coastal
areas are in mean 0.108 (10.8%) larger than for those not operating in coastal
areas.
7 Discussion
While Odeck and Alkadi (2001) draw no specific conclusions with respect to
possible managerial and policy implications, Jørgensen et al. (1995), using
almost the same data set as ours but a traditional econometric model, obtain
results that in general are in accordance with our findings. They estimate
that companies operating in coastal areas have 10% higher costs than else-
where, and that bus companies engaged in sea transport have 16% higher
costs than those not engaged in sea transport. Moreover, subsidy allocation
policies influence total costs such that the cost reduction when changing pol-
icy from negotiations to cost norms reduces with 20% for public companies
and 12% for private companies.
However, using MEA we can say more than that: we find that the about
10 percentage points of possible saving for companies operating in coastal
areas are primarily related to inefficient utilization of the Fuel input, as is
the 6.5 percentage points saving for private companies. Fixing the Fuel costs,
potential savings in Driver costs were found to be about 4 percentage points
larger for public than for private companies. And finally, among companies
with comparable Fuel and Driver costs, those with subsidy allocation based
on negotiations had almost 3 percentage point larger saving potential. For
policy makers this information is useful as it identifies more precisely the
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possible contribution which introduction of cost norms can achieve in terms
of improved cost efficiency.
Jørgensen et al. (1995) find it remarkable that companies engaged in sea
transport were found to have 16% higher costs than the others. In the MEA
analysis, controlling for Fuel costs, the difference in saving potentials between
those engaged and those not engaged in sea transport is estimated to only 5.7
% for Driver costs. Moreover, engagement in sea transport was not found to
relate to saving marginally in neither Fuel costs nor Other costs, given Fuel
and Driver costs. This is probably a more realistic result suggesting that
diseconomies of scope are less important
In a later paper, Jørgensen et al. (1997) use stochastic frontier models.
Here the response variable is total cost per vehicle-kilometer. The obtained
inefficiencies are subsequently analyzed for influence of the external variables
and they find that neither ownership nor subsidy policy influence inefficiency.
The obtained results were found to be dependent on the choice of error
distribution and consequently only weak conclusions are stated. However,
their result is in accordance with the present results, where the potential for
savings was found only to depend on whether or not the company operates
in coastal areas.
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